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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH 
LINES, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and JESSE R. 
S. BUDGE, COMMISSIONERS OF 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, and DAVID M. 
\YELLING, doing business as DAVID 
M. WELLING CO., 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Case No. 8942 
This case is before the Supreme Court on a Writ of 
Review, directed to the defendants, and for purposes of 
reviewing an order of the Public Service Commission of 
Utah dated June 18, 1958, which granted to defendant 
David M. Welling, doing business as David M. Welling 
Company (hereinafter referred to as defendant) Certi-
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ficate of Covenience and Necessity No. 1245-Sub 1, em-
bracing operating rights hereinafter set forth. 
Defendant Welling's application was filed June 2, 
1958, and notice thereof given. However, the application 
was so defective that the scope of the authority sought 
could not be determined therefrom. Thus at the outset of 
the hearing, without further notice, defendant's applica-
tion was substantially amended to clarify the nature and 
extent of the authority requested (Tr. 5 to 16). As 
amended the application requests authority "to transport 
airplane passengers and their baggage from the Hotel 
Ben Lomond in Ogden, Utah, Hill Field Main Gate, Naval 
Supply Base l\ifain Gate, Roy, Sunset, Clearfield, Kays-
ville, and Layton, on the one hand, and Salt Lake City 
Municipal Airport, on the other hand, also, from Brigham 
City and Perry, on the one hand, and Salt Lake City 
Municipal Airport, on the other hand, both of said serv-
ices to include a return frmn said airport to said points 
and places above named; the transportation from and to 
Brigham City to be limited to one trip per day." ('Tr.100). 
The Conrmission granted authority identical to that out-
lined in the amended application (Tr. 102). Authority 
heretofore held by defendant "\Yelling is outlined in Cer-
tificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1245 granted 
July 18, 1957 (Tr.105). Under such former grant defend-
ant received authority to transport airplane passengers 
and their baggage frmn the Ben Lonwnd Hotel in Ogden, 
to the Salt Lake City Municipal Airport, and frmn said 
airport to said Ben Lornond Hotel, 01nitting any inter-
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nwdiate service between said points and limited to four 
trips per day to and from said airport (Tr. 108). 
Hearing before the Commission was held on June 11, 
1958, upon application filed June 2, 1958, and the Report 
and Order was issued June 18, 1958. A total of seven pro-
testants filed appearances (Tr.1). Mr. David M. Welling 
appeared as the sole witness for defendant and testified 
as to the present and proposed operation ( Tr. 16-51). The 
operation presently conducted by defendant Welling com-
mendced pursuant to certificate No. 1245 the last week of 
July, 1957 (Tr. 16). For a period of three months de-
fendant Welling operated on schedule (Tr. 39), but on 
November 1, 1957 was forced by financial necessity to re-
duce his operations to the point of operating only 50% 
of his schedules (Tr. 40). From November 1, 1957 to the 
present time, defendant has continued to run only 50% 
of his schedules and on several days in this period no 
trips at all were operated (Tr. 16). 
Defendant Welling does not propose to add any 
equipment or drivers, but merely seeks for himself an ad-
ditional source of revenue in the hope of making his oper-
ation economically sound (Tr. 44). In his current opera-
tion substantial losses have resulted (Tr. 43). Gross 
revenue for the period of July, 1957, to December, 1957, 
amounted to $2,613.00, while expenditures for that same 
period totaled $5,064.41, resulting in a net operating loss 
of $2,451.39 (Tr. 42-43). Notwithstanding the admission 
of his inability to maintain his runs as scheduled and the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
fact that he is unable to operate without a substantial 
loss, defendant Welling proposes to conduct the new 
operation in generally the same manner as he has the 
former (Tr. 45). It should be noted that with respect to 
the financial loss suffered by defendant there was an 
allusion made to a strike by the employees of Western 
Airlines, indicating that this was the cause or at least a 
substantial cause of the failure of defendant's operation 
to show a profit (Tr. 49). However, the strike referred 
to occurred some time after the figures for 1957 were 
compiled and had no affect whatsoever upon the operating 
loss of $2,451.39 shown in defendant's statement of De-
cember 31, 1957 (Tr. 49). Further inquiry by counsel into 
the financial aspects of defendant's operation was not 
permitted, even though on its face the business was shown 
to make no economic sense (Tr. 49). The relevance of this 
material was pointed out, but inquiry still refused by 
the Examiner (Tr. 49-50). Information on this point 
would seern necessary to any intelligent determination of 
the feasibility of defendant's proposed operation. 
A number of obvious difficulties present themselves 
with reference to the proposed schedule advanced by ap-
plicant in this matter (Tr. 79). These will be considered 
in greater detail in the argument, but it is evident, even 
in the face of defendant's avowed intention of running 
a schedule to meet a single passenger, that, with the alter-
native tin1es allowed defendant on six of the seven pro-
posed schedules ( Tr. 79), 1nany long and tedious waiting 
periods at the airport by passengers will result. 
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No passenger witnesses were produced by defendant 
even though defendant Welling claimed requests for his 
service, particularly from Hill Air Force Base and the 
Thiokol Plant near Brigham City. Notwithstanding the 
alleged urgency of these requests as testified to by de-
fendant over objection of protestant (Tr. 20), neither 
installation was sufficiently concerned to send repre-
sentatives to the hearing. In fact, the record affirmatively 
shows that Hill Ar Force Base provides its own trans-
portation to and from the Salt Lake Airport, operating 
24 hours a day (Tr. 19). 
The operating testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, 
Alma C. Johnson, shows Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, 
Inc., is operating under Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity numbers 288 and 545, which authorize plain-
tiff to transport passengers, baggage and express be-
tween Salt Lake City and all points mentioned in this 
application except Brigham City and the Main Gate and 
the Naval Supply Depot (Tr. 58), (although plaintiff's 
buses operate past the east gate on U.S. 91), and plain-
tiff is currently operating a number of schedules each day 
to all points authorized (Tr. 58). The buses run by plain-
tiff on its schedules are at present carrying on the aver-
age only a 50% passenger load (Tr. 60). Plaintiff has 
terminal facilities available downtown in Ogden (Tr. 61), 
and in the Salt Lake City business district (Tr. 61). Cab 
service is available at all times at both the Ogden and 
Salt Lake terminals (Tr. 61), and meets existing sched-
ules. 
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In 1957 for a period of three weeks plaintiff con-
ducted a limousine service similar to that now proposed 
by defendant, from Ogden and intermediate points to 
the Salt Lake Airport ('Tr. 62). Plaintiff held itself avail-
able to pick up and deliver passengers to all points con-
cerned in this application between the Salt Lake Airport 
and Ogden (Tr. 63). The operation had to be discontinued 
however, since so few people requested the service that 
it was not economically possible to continue (Tr. 64). In 
fact, from the intermediate points between Ogden and the 
airport, including points for which authority is here 
sought, no passengers were carried in the three weeks 
of operation (Tr. 63). Plaintiff at the present time still 
holds the authority to conduct this proposed operation, 
however, further study has indicated that at this time 
such operation still is not financially feasible (Tr. 66). 
Plaintiff stands ready at any tune and now possesses 
adequate equipment to re-institute this operation if con-
ditions so warrant (Tr. 67). While the last schedule 
change adopted by plaintiff offered two additional sched-
ules in the hope of bettering its service to the public (Tr. 
69), its business has suffered a drop in revenue of 8% 
this year (Tr. 67-68), and a further decline would require 
plaintiff to reduce its service (Tr. 68). 
Further evidence of the already adequate existing 
service in this area and the adverse effect to be realized 
from the grant of authority herein was offered by pro-
testant Western Greyhound Line. Greyhound operates 
13 daily schedules between Brigham City, Ogden and Salt 
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Lake (Tr. 52). As noted by Warren H. Perry, operating 
witness for Western Greyhound Lines, this line needs the 
present volume of business, and any further inroads 
would be detrimental to existing service (Tr. 54). A third 
protesting witness, Ray Moss, manager of the Ogden 
Cab and Transfer Company, indicated that his company 
has suffered a decline of 10 to 11% in its business in 
the past few years (Tr. 74), and a further decline would 
jeopardize that company's position and ability to continue 
operations (Tr. 74). A substantial decrease has been 
noted in the Salt Lake business handled by the Ogden 
Cab and Transfer Company since defendant commenced 
its operation in July, 1957 (Tr. 74). At this time the 
cab company averages 15 to 20 trips per month from 
Ogden and vicinity to the Salt Lake Airport at a fare of 
$10.00 per cab (Tr. 76). Moss testified that cabs from 
his company are available for transportation from Ogden 
and vicinity to the Salt Lake Airport at all times (Tr. 
74). 
After the conclusion of the hearing and on June 18, 
1958, the Commission issued the Report and Order here 
under review. By paragraph seven of the Findings of 
Fact the commission found as follows: 
"The service proposed by applicant is an im-
provement over his present operation and as such 
will be of benefit to the general public in the areas 
sought to be served. Improvements in service 
rendered by already certified carriers should be 
encouraged, if in the public interest, even though 
some detriment may result to other carriers (U.P. 
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Motor Freight Co. v. Gallagher Transfer and Stor-
age Co., Wyo. 264 P. 2d 771- I.C:C. v. Parker, 
326 U.S. 60), and evidence that the route is not at 
present adequately served is not necessary to the 
granting of an application for authority to insti-
tute an improved service." (Tr. 101). 
It is obvious from this that the Commission made no 
finding that there was any public need for the proposed 
service or that any inadequacy existed in the present 
service. In granting this certificate the Commission com-
pletely abandoned the established concept of convenience 
and necessity and based the grant on the fact that appli-
cant is losing money and offering cheaper rates. 
Following issuance of the order herein, plaintiff filed 
a detailed petition for rehearing (Tr. 110), which was 
denied by the Commission on July 7, 1958 (Tr. 113). 
STATEMEN·T OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANT A ·CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND DIR-
ECTLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
(A) THE FINDING BY THE COMMISSION THAT THE 
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SERVICES NEED NOT BE CON-
SIDERED IN THE GRANTING OF A CERTIFICATE OF 
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY IS CONTRARY TO UTAH 
LAW, AND THE FINDING OF CONVENIENCE AND NECES-
SITY REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE IS NOT SUBSTANTI-
ATED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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(B) THE SERVICE PROPOSED BY THE DEFENDANT 
IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENTLY EXIST-
ING SERVICE AS FOUND BY THE COMMISSION BUT IS 
AN ENTIRELY NEW SERVICE. 
(C) THE EXISTING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES 
IN THE AREA SOUGHT TO BE SERVED ARE ADEQUATE 
TO MEET ALL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC. 
POINT II. 
THE REAL BASES FOR THE GRANTING OF TI-IIS 
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, (1) 
THAT IN HIS PRESENT OPERATION DEFENDANT IS 
SUFFERING FROM SEVERE FINANCIAL LOSSES AND (2) 
THAT DEFENDANT IS OFFERING CHEAPER RATES 
THAN THOSE OFFERED BY EXISTING CARRIERS, ARE 
UNAUTHORIZED AND CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, WHICH 
REQUIRES A FINDING BASED ON COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. 
POINT III. 
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WILL DIRECTLY 
AND ADVERSELY AFFECT PLAINTIFF AND OTHER 
EXISTING CARRIERS BY DIVERTING VITALLY NEEDED 
TRAFFIC FROM THEIR LINES. 
POINT IV. 
THE COMMISSION HAS MADE FINDINGS OF FACT 
BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO 
UTAH LAW WHICH REQUIRES THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COMMISSION TO BE BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANT A .CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND 
NECESSITY IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND DIR-
ECTLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
(A) THE FINDING BY THE COMMISSION THAT THE 
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING SERVICES NEED NOT BE CON-
SIDERED IN THE GRANTING OF A ·CERTIFICATE OF 
CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY IS CONTRARY TO UTAH 
LAW, AND THE FINDING OF CONVENIENCE AND NECES-
SITY REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE IS NOT SUBSTANTI-
ATED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In finding that evidence of the adequacy of existing 
facilities need not he considered hy the Public Service 
Commission in granting a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity ( Tr. 101) the Commission completely ignoreti 
both the controlling Utah statute and Utah case law. 
Section 54-6-5 U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
"If the Cornn1ission finds from the evidence 
that the public convenience and necessity require 
the proposed service or any part thereof it may 
issue the certificate as prayed for ... otherwise 
such certificate shall he denied. Before granting 
a certificate to a co1n1non n1otor carrier the Com-
mission shall take into eonsideration the financial 
ability of the applicant to properly perform the 
service sought under the certificate and also th~ 
character of the highway over which said common 
carrier proposes to operate and the effect thereon, 
and upon the traveling public using the same, 
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and also the existing transportation facilities in 
the area proposed to be served." 
In construing this section the Utah Supreme Court 
in Ashworth Transfer Company v. Publi'c Service Com-
mission, 268 P. (2d) 990 (1954) said that while a finding 
of total inadequacy was not necessary, the Commission 
was required to consider the existing transportation 
facilities in the area before issuing a Certificate. Dealing 
again with this specific point the Utah court said in 
the case of Mulcahy v. Public Service CommissiJon, 117 
P. (2d) 298, 300 (1949). "It is a definite need of the 
public where no reasonably adequate service exists." Fur-
ther, at page 301 the court stated, "If existing services 
are rendering adequate service, ordinarily a certificate 
will not be granted putting a new competitor in the field." 
The action of the Commission in granting the certificate 
at issue here is directly contrary to the clearly expressed 
requirements of Utah law. 
• Rather than apply Utah law, the Commission here 
looked to the Wyoming case of Union Pacific Motor 
Freight Co. v. Gallagher Transfer and Storage Co., 264 
P. (2d) 771 (1954), and the federal case of I.C.C. v. Par-
ker, 326 U.S. 60 (1945). However, both of these cases 
were decided under statutes substantially different on 
this point from the Utah statute. Neither statute contains 
the specific mandate found in the Utah Code that con-
sideration must be given to the adequacy of existing serv-
ices. The Commission is grasping at straws in relying 
on the Union Pacific and Parker cases, as neither has the 
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slightest application here. The facts are in no way anal-
agous, as will be shown, and the statute governing the 
decisions are completely different. The only possible 
application is the statement of the United States Su-
preme Court in the Parker case, supra at page 64, that to 
be valid the findings of the Commission must be based on 
the proper statutory criteria. The Commission totally 
failed to apply the Utah statutory criteria. 
While in its conclusion (Tr. 102) the Commission 
stated that public convenience and necessity justifies the 
granting of the certificate, not an iota of evidence was 
introduced which would support this conclusion. In its 
nature the concept of finding that public convenience and 
necessity exist is dependent~ as an essential element, upon 
the inadequacy of the services being performed by exist-
ing carriers. As will be shown, the evidence overwhelm-
ingly shows the total absence of any need for new service. 
It is apparent that the Commission's conclusion that pub-
lice convenience and necessity justify the grant is en-
tirely without foundation. 
(B) THE SERVICE PROPOSED BY THE DEFENDANT 
IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENTLY EXIST-
ING SERVICE AS FOUND BY THE ·COMMISSION BUT IS 
AN ENTIRELY NEW SERVICE. 
As has been shown, the Connnission erred in conclud-
ing that the adequacy of existing service need not be 
considered in the granting of a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity. It is also readily apparent that the Com-
rnission was in error in finding that a new service was not 
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involved here. In paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact 
(Tr. 101), the Com1nission found that the proposed serv-
ice was not a new service but merely an improvement of 
the present operation. It tacitly accepted the fact that 
the evidence was inadequate to support the grant and 
atten1pted to reach for some other approach, here that 
this is not a r11atter of new service at all. 
Defendant's present service consists of transporting 
passengers from the Ben Lomond Hotel in Ogden to the 
Salt Lake Airport and return. No service whatsoever is 
rendered to any intermediate points, and no service is 
extended to Brigham City (Tr. 108). Under the proposed 
operation defendant will serve the points of Hill Field 
Main Gate, Naval Supply Depot Main Gate, Roy, Sunset, 
Clearfield, Kaysville, Layton, Brigham City and Perry, 
none of which are now served by applicant (Tr. 102). By 
no stretch of the imagination can this be called an im-
provement of an existing service, and it constitutes 
nothing more or less than a new service to points not 
heretofore served. Indeed the very cases cited by the 
Commission in paragraph 7 of its Report and Order 
recognize that where service is extended to points not 
previously served, such service constitutes a new service 
and not merely an improvement of an existing service. 
See Union Pacific Motor Fre~ght Co. v. Gallagher Trans-
fer and Storage Company, supra, and 1.0.0. v. Parker, 
supra. 
In both cases the courts noted that the grant of au-
thority was limited to points already served by the ap-
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plicant. In the Union Pacific case, supra, at page 775, 
the Wyoming court cited the Report and Order of the 
Wyoming Public Service Commission which said in hold-
ing a new service was not involved, "The Union Pacific 
Motor Freight Company is not seeking to serve new 
points." Quoting again from the Union Pacific opinion, 
the court at page 782 in describing an improved operation 
as contrasted with a new one said, "Applicant does not 
propose to invade territory of any other carrier. All of 
the points or stations are on the rail line which applicant 
has served for years." 
It is apparent that providing service to new points 
1s the essence of the operation proposed by defendant 
Welling. 
In light of the authorities cited by the Commission 
as well as an analysis of the service it is obvious that the 
conclusion reached by the Commission, that the proposed 
operation is not a new service, is clearly erroneous. 
(C) THE EXISTING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES 
IN THE AREA SOUGHT TO BE SERVED ARE ADEQUATE 
TO MEET ALL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC. 
The burden of proving that public convenience and 
necessity require the grant of a certificate is placed upon 
the defendant, and a 1nere sho·wing of convenience or 
benefit to the applicant or a few passengers is not a suffi-
cient basis for granting a pennit. See lVycoff Co. v. 
Public Serv~ce Comm1:ssi·on, ~:27 P. (2d) 323 (1951). An 
exmnination of the transeript shows that applicant totally 
failed to discharge this burden. 
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No shipper witnesses were presented by applicant. 
The total testimony presented by him amounted only to 
vague allegations that he had received requests for the 
proposed service. Requests for service were reported to 
have been received from Hill Air Force Base ( Tr. 19), 
but no representative was called from the base to testify 
as to these requests or any need for new service. The de-
fendant's own testimony shows that Hill Field in fact 
is supplying its own transportation on a 24 hour a day 
basis ( Tr. 19). In an attempt to bolster defendant's evi-
dence the Commission found in paragraph 8 of the Report 
and Order that the service was needed to Brigham City 
for the Thiokol plant, since "the personnel of said com-
pany does considerable traveling by air." (Tr. 101). The 
record is absolutely barren of any evidence which could 
support this conclusion. The only material in the testi-
mony concerning any requests by the Thiokol plant is 
found at page 27 of the transcript. There defendant 
\V elling testified as to the Brigham City run as follows : 
"Yes; that trip has been requested by the Thio-
kol people in Brigham City, and most of their 
people go out in the coach flight at midnight ... " 
Such a statement could not possibly substantiate the 
conclusion reached by the Commission that the company 
does considerable traveling by air. No mention was made 
of how many Thiokol employees travel at all, let alone 
by air. No witness from the Thiokol plant was produced 
as would be expected if that plant had a need for the pro-
posed service. Defendant Welling was allowed to testify 
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as to the existing transportation facilities in the area, 
even though on voir dire examination counsel showed 
defendant lacked capacity to so testify (Tr. 34-35). Be-
yond his own vague statements as to requests received 
applicant offered no evidence of any need for his service. 
The only evidence produced by defendant Welling was 
that he is operating at a considerable loss and is offer-
ing cheaper service. It is incredible that a certificate could 
be granted upon such a showing. 
Alma C. Johnson, operating witness for plaintiff, 
testified that plaintiff serves all points concerned in the 
application except Brigham City and the Main Gate of the 
Naval Supply Base (Tr. 58), although plaintiff's serv-
ice runs adjacent to the Naval Supply Base (Tr. 58). 
Plaintiff provides 14 schedules per day each way to the 
points involved herein, and provides additional schedules 
to Kaysville (Tr. 59). Space is always available on Lake 
Shore's buses which on the average are running only 50% 
loaded in this area (Tr. 59, 60). Extra equipment is avail-
able to accomn1odate any increase in traffic (Tr. 59). 
Plaintiff's buses run fron1 its terminal in the heart 
of downtown Salt Lake City to the heart of downtown 
Ogden where its terminal facilities are located (Tr. 61). 
Cab service is available at all times at each of plaintiff's 
terminals to transport passengers to their destinations 
(Tr. 61, 62). In 1957 plaintiff engaged in the operation 
proposed to be conducted by defendant (Tr. 62). Its ex-
perience in this venture conclusively proves there is no 
public need for such serviee (Tr. 63). In the three weeks 
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advantage of the service. Plaintiff served Ogden and 
all intennediate points here involved with direct trans-
portation to and frmn the Salt Lake Airport. Only a fe\v 
passengers fron1 the Ogden area were hauled and none 
from the intermediate areas (Tr. 63). The Commission's 
lack of attention to the evidence presented at the hearing 
is graphically shown by the totally erroneous fact finding 
concerning this operation. The Commission in paragraph 
6 of its Report and Order found that the Ogden Cab and 
Transfer Company conducted this service and made no 
atten1pt to advertise the service (Tr. 101). As a matter 
of fact, as the transcript clearly shows upon even a casual 
perusal, it was Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc., which 
operated the service ( Tr. 62, 63) and the service was ad-
vertised through the airlines and information dissem-
inated to all ticket agents in the area (Tr. 65, 66). 
Plaintiff still holds authority to render this service and 
has continued to study the situation (Tr. 66). While 
plaintiff stands ready to re-institute the service if con-
ditions warrant, such change in demand has not occurred 
(Tr. 67). To accommodate passengers who desire to 
travel to Salt Lake between the hours of midnight and 
6:00 a.m., plaintiff's tickets are honored by the Western 
Greyhound Lines which operates runs during those hours. 
Evidence presented by other protestants add to the 
evidence that existing services are adequate. Western 
Greyhound Lines, which serves Brigham City and Ogden 
to and from Salt Lake City, provides 13 schedules per 
day each way, an average of one run every two hours 
(Tr. 52). The Ogden Cab and Transfer Co. provides 
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cab service from Ogden and vicinity to the Salt Lake 
Airport and return (Tr. 74). This company has cabs 
available at all times ( Tr. 7 4) and has been making 15 
to 20 trips per month from Ogden to the Salt Lake Air-
port (Tr. 76). 
Considering the facilities now available, it is ap-
parent that faster service is accorded to passengers at 
the present than would be the case under the proposed 
operation. An Ogden passenger arriving at the Salt Lake 
Airport now can immediately get a cab at the airport 
terminal, alight from the cab at the Salt Lake terminal 
of Lakeshore Motor Lines and within a short time be 
on his way to Ogden aboard one of Lakeshore's 14 daily 
schedules. Arriving at Lakeshore's terminal in downtown 
Ogden he n1ay immediately take a cab from the terminal 
to his home (Tr. 61, 59, Ex. 5, Tr. 88, 62). Compare this 
with the plight of a passenger using defendant's pro-
posed service who arrives by air in Salt Lake at 6:30 
a.m. on a n1orning when defendant's rnorning run was 
made to accmnrnodate a passenger arriving in Salt Lake 
at 5:30 a.n1. 'rhe later passenger rnust then wait at the 
airport until schedule nurnber two arrives· in Salt Lake 
at either 10 :20 or 11 :30, depending on reservations. He 
then rides back to Ogden where he is discharged at the 
Ben Lomond Hotel and takes a cab to his home (Ex. 1, 
Tr. 46, 79). In another situation a passenger from Ogden 
whose flight leaves the Salt Lake Airport at 8:00 a.m. 
rnust leave Ogden at -! :30 a.rn., arrive at the Airport at 
5 :30 then wait for his flight if defendant has another 
passenger leaving Salt Lake at 5:30 (Tr. -!G, 79, Ex. 1). 
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Such exmnples could be rnultiplied a number of 
tirnes. To illustrate the Con1mission's utter disregard 
of the evidence it is noted that defendant's schedules 
numbers two and three can't possibly be operated as out-
lined by defendant (Tr. 79). Welling is operating with 
a single limousine, and does not propose to acquire addi-
tional equipment. His earliest schedule will arrive back 
in Ogden at 11 :20 a.rn. Yet schedule three is supposed 
to leave Ogden at 11 :15, five minutes before the limousine 
has arrived from Salt Lake (Tr. 79). This discrepancy 
appears without allowing time for the discharge and 
loading of passengers and baggage. No explanation was 
offered as to how this phenomenon was to occur, yet the 
Commission approved the operation as scheduled (Tr. 
102). 
In light of all the above evidence, clearly the only 
finding that could be reasonably reached is that there 
is no need for any additional service. 
POINT II. 
THE REAL BASES FOR THE GRANTING OF THIS. 
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, (1) 
THAT IN HIS PRESENT OPERATION DEFENDANT IS 
SUFFERING FROM SEVERE FINANCIAL LOSSES AND (2) 
THAT DEFENDANT IS OFFERING CHEAPER RATES 
THAN THOSE OFFERED BY EXISTING CARRIERS, ARE 
UNAUTHORIZED AND CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW, WHICH 
REQUIRES A FINDING BASED ON COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. 
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By paragraph two, three and four of its Report and 
Order the Commission found that defendant was suffer-
ing serious financial losses in his operation ( Tr. 100) 
and that passengers utilizing the services of Lake Shore 
and Ogden Cab Company must pay larger fares than 
defendant offers (Tr. 100, 101). These findings generally 
are in accord with the evidence; in fact the only real 
evidence offered by defendant concerned the losses suf-
fered and rates offered. However, the fare per passenger 
when traveling via the Ogden Cab and Transfer Com-
pany might well in some instances be cheaper than 
Welling's. The cost of $10 per cab is shared among the 
passengers, while vV elling's charge of $3.00 per passen-
ger is constant. These findings of financial losses and 
cheaper service under the law cannot substantiate a grant 
of a certificate. 
That defendant Welling suffered a loss of $2,451.39 
in five months of operation in 1957 (Tr. 43) shows that 
the certificate should never have been issued in the first 
instance. His gross revenue was $2,613.00, while expend-
itures amounted to $5,064.41 (Tr. 43). The Commission 
made a grave error in allowing defendant to commence 
operations in 1957 and should not now attempt to rectify 
this forn1er mistake by granting new and additional 
authority. The experience of plaintiff in atten1pting to 
operate the proposed service a year ago (Tr. 62, 63) 
demonstrates that such a run is not econ01nically feasible. 
To allow the certificate for this proposed operation would 
c01npound the 1nistake, throwing the burden of the error 
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on existing carriers. A policy of the Comnrission of at-
temptng to cover its mistakes by allowing a dying busi-
ness to expand operations will ultimately have disastrous 
consequences for the whole trucking industry. 
Defendant Welling testified that at the previous 
hearing on his first application in July, 1957, he stated 
that the operation then proposed would produce a profit 
(Tr. 40). Yet he was able to operate on schedule for only 
three n1onths (Tr. 39) because he was losing money so 
fast he couldn't continue (Tr. 26). Since November 1, 
1957, defendant has been operating only 50% of his 
schedule (Tr. 40). By his own testimony defendant 
Welling admitted his current operation was not econom-
ically sound and that his motive in asking for this certi-
fcate was to try to make up his losses (Tr. 43). At page 
44 of the transcript, he stated: 
". . . So the purpose of this hearing is to request 
the things that we feel should be done now to make 
it economically sound ... " 
To attract passengers defendant has set his rates 
at a low level even though such rate is clearly non-
compensatory ( Tr. 101). As provided in Section 54-6-2 
U.C.A. (1953), it is the duty of the Commission to es-
talish rates, and those now charged by existing carriers 
are in accord with the requirements of the Commission. 
The action of the Commission in granting authority to 
another competitor on the ground that cheaper rates are 
to be charged by the new line is a flagrant abuse of its 
discretion in light of such authority. 
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It is essential to the orderly administration of the 
Inotor carrier industry that the law establishing the 
basis upon which certificates are granted be followed, 
and to do otherwise precipitates a confusion in the in-
dustry as to the basis of regulation. Where, as here, 
grants of authority are issued with indifference to 
statutory requirements, the entire concept of our legis-
lature in regulation is destroyed. 
POINT III. 
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WILL DIRECTLY 
AND ADVERSELY AFFECT PLAINTIFF AND OTHER 
EXISTING CARRIERS BY DIVERTING VITALLY NEEDED 
TRAFFIC FROM THEIR LINES. 
The implications of a grant of common carrier au-
thority in an area where such grant will decrease the 
business of existing carriers are much more far-reaching 
than the reduction in revenue of those carriers. Operating 
an efficient transportation service is a costly business 
and losses in revenue of necessity n1ust require a re-
examination of the schedules and facilities offered to 
the public. If revenue decreases to the point where re-
duction in service Inust be Inade the ultin1ate effect is 
that the traveling public n1ust suffer frmn lack of service. 
It is this ultimate consequence which renders important 
the evidence of the adverse effect a new grant of author-
ity will have on existing carriers. In the findings of 
fact (Para. 7, Tr. 101) it is acknowledged that detriment 
will result to the other carriers here involved, but the 
Commission holds that such detriment could be disre-
garded (Tr. 101). 
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That all the traffic available in this area is vital 
to plaintiff and the other carriers is clearly shown in the 
evidence. Plaintiff is currently running its schedules to 
Ogden only 50% loaded ( Tr. 60). Through the past year 
Lakeshore has suffered a drop in revenue of seven to 
eight per cent (Tr. 67). As to further decline in revenue 
plaintiff's witness Alma C. Johnson testified as follows: 
"Q. And what effect, if any, will be pro-
duced by a further dilution of your passenger 
revenues~ What is that going to do to the Lake-
shore Motor Coach Lines~ 
A. Well, it will tend to aggravate the present 
situation, which is that our revenues are declin-
ing to the point where we will probably have to 
reschedule some of our operations." (Tr. 68). 
Testimony from other protesting carriers indicate 
the ill effects will follow the granting of this certificate. 
Ray E. Moss, operating witness for protestant Ogden 
Cab and Transit Company, testified that his company 
has suffered a decline of ten to eleven per cent in busi-
ness in the past few years (Tr. 74), and that a further 
decline will jeopardize the company's position (Tr. 74). 
That further decline may be anticipated as a result of the 
issuance to defendant Welling of this certificate is il-
lustrated by the fact that Ogden Cab and Transit Com-
pany has observed a decrease in the number of trips to 
Salt Lake since defendant commenced operations in 1957 
(Tr. 75). The cab company at this time Inakes 15 to 20 
trips per Inonth to the Salt Lake Airport at a fare of $10 
per cab (Tr. 76). Loss of this revenue would seriously 
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affect its business. Warren H. Perry, operating witness 
for Western Greyhound Lines, pointed out that its 
recent application for rate increase indicates the bus 
lines need to retain the present volume of business and 
that any further inroads on this volume would prove 
detrimental to existing service (Tr. 54). 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Mulcahy 
v. Public Service Commission, supra, in addressing itself 
to this point, said that present certificate holders should 
be protected insofar as it can be done without injury to 
the public. Certainly in this case protecting the existing 
carriers will not produce injury to the public, but will, 
in fact, protect the traveling public. In order to maintain 
the standards of service now afforded the public by exist-
ing carriers the order of the commission granting a cer-
tificate should be reversed. 
POINT IV. 
THE COMMISSION HAS MADE FINDINGS OF FACT 
BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO 
UTAH LAW WHICH REQUIRES THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COMMISSION TO BE BASED ON COMPETENT EVIDEN·CE. 
The general rule on this point was clearly set forth 
1n Dese.rt Turf Club v. Board of Sup'rs of Riverside 
County, 296 P (2d) 882 (Calif.) (1956) at page 887: 
"While adn1inistrative bodies are not expected 
to observe meticulously all of the rules of evi-
dence applicable to a court trial co1n1non sens~ 
and fair play djctate certain basic requiren1ents 
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for conduct of any hearing at which facts are to 
be determined. An1ong these are the following ... 
hearsay evidence standing alone can have no 
weight." 
This principal is stated as the general rule in 43 AmJ ur 
Public Utilities and Services sec. 219, where it is said 
that a commission 1nay not base an order on incompetent 
evidence. In 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities sec. 53, the rule is 
noted that there must be sufficient competent evidence 
in the record to support the commission's findings. The 
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly subscribed to this 
rule. See W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
277 P (2d) 809 (1954; Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public 
Service Comn~ission, 268 P (2d) 990 (1954); Union Pa-
cific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 132 P (2d) 128 
(1942); Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 117 P 
(2d) 298 (1941). 
In this record there is not a single shred of com-
petent evidence on which a finding of a need for this 
service could be based. No shipper witnesses were intro-
duced by Welling. The entire body of evidence offered 
by him concerning need for this service consisted of 
hearsay statements by Welling of requests he claimed 
had been made (Tr. 16 to 51). In paragraph two of the 
Findings of Fact (Tr.lOO) the Commission acknowledged 
that there was no competent evidence upon which to base 
a finding of need when it stated that the only evidence 
was applicant's testimony as to requests he had received. 
Even after acknowledging this complete lack of compe-
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tent evidence of need, the Commission still granted a 
certificate solely on the basis of the hearsay evidence, 
admitted over protest. Such an action is a flagrant dis-
regard of the controlling Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the action of the 
Public Service Connnission in granting the certificate 
of convenience and necessity to defendant Welling is 
arbitrary and capricious and directly contrary to the 
evidence. The Commission erred in failing to consider 
the adequacy of services presently existing and in find-
ing that the proposed service is merely an extension of 
the current service. The grant of authority will adversely 
affect plaintiff and other carriers which are currently 
providing adequate service to the area. The finding of the 
Commission that a need existed is based solely on hear-
say evidence, which cannot form the basis of grant. 
The order of the Cmnmission should be set aside. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
WOOD R. WORSLEY and SKEEN 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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